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longstanding, but little systematic empirical research has been brought to bear on the relative merits of these
theories. We argue that while interest group demands and institutions are often regarded as having
independent and competing effects, it is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as
conditional on the other. As explanations emphasizing societal interests contend, deteriorating
macroeconomic conditions are a potent source of protectionist sentiment. The extent to which such
conditions reduce commercial openness, however, depends centrally on a country's political institutions,
especially the number of veto points in a country's policy-making structure and its regime type. We expect the
effects of macroeconomic conditions on trade policy to become weaker as the number of veto points
increases. We also expect both veto points and the societal pressures stemming from the economy to have a
more potent impact on trade policy in democracies than in other regimes. The results of our statistical tests
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Abstract 
 
Societal theories of trade policy stress the importance of domestic interest groups, 
whereas statist theories focus on the effects of domestic institutions.  Debates over the relative 
merits of these approaches have been fierce, but little systematic empirical research has been 
brought to bear on the relative merits of these theories.  In this paper, we argue that, while 
societal and statist factors are generally regarded as having independent and competing effects, it 
is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as conditional on the other.  As 
societal explanations contend, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are a potent source of 
protectionist pressures.  The extent to which such conditions reduce commercial openness, 
however, depends centrally on the domestic institutions through which societal pressures must 
filter to influence policy. 
Two institutional features stand out.  First, in states marked by greater fragmentation and 
more “veto points,” it is harder to change existing policies because any number of actors can 
block such change.  Consequently, we expect the effects of macroeconomic conditions on trade 
policy to be weaker in fragmented states than in those characterized by a highly centralized 
national government.  Second, we expect both fragmentation and the societal pressures stemming 
from the economy to have a more potent impact on trade policy in democracies than in other 
regimes, since the electoral constraints facing democratic leaders force them to respond to 
demands made by key segments of society.  The results of our statistical tests covering more than 
one hundred countries during the period from 1980 to 2000 strongly support these arguments. 
 
 
Keywords: Protectionism, openness, veto players, veto points, positive political theory, 
unemployment, trade   
JEL Classifications: F13, P16, P26
Introduction 
  
Much of the recent literature on the political economy of trade policy emphasizes the role 
of domestic politics.  Societal theories of foreign economic policy stress the importance of 
domestic interest groups, whereas statist theories focus on the effects of domestic institutions.  
Debates over the relative merits of these approaches have been fierce, but little systematic 
empirical research has been brought to bear on the relative merits of these theories.  Moreover, 
most extant research addresses trade policy in stable, mature and wealthy democracies, a tack 
that places important restrictions on the range of both interest group pressures and domestic 
political institutions that are analyzed and thereby hampers efforts to assess the usefulness of 
each approach. 
In this paper, we analyze the domestic determinants of commercial openness for 
democracies and non-democracies at all stages of economic development.  Our core argument is 
that, while societal and statist factors are generally regarded as having independent and 
competing effects, it is more fruitful to view the influence of each type of factor as conditional 
on the other.  More specifically, as societal explanations contend, deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions are a potent source of protectionist sentiment in society.  The extent to which such 
conditions reduce commercial openness, however, depends centrally on the domestic political 
institutions through which societal pressures must filter to influence policy. 
Two institutional features stand out.  First, countries vary substantially in the degree to 
which authority is concentrated within the national government.  In states marked by greater 
fragmentation and more “veto points,” it is harder to change existing policies because any 
number of actors can block such change.  Consequently, we expect the effects of macroeconomic 
conditions on trade policy to be weaker in fragmented states than in those characterized by a 
highly centralized national government.  Second, we expect both fragmentation and the societal 
pressures stemming from the economy to have a more potent impact on commercial openness in 
democracies than in other regimes.  The electoral constraints facing democratic leaders force 
them to respond to demands made by key segments of society.  While autocrats can more easily 
change policies than democratic leaders, regardless of how concentrated power is in a 
democracy, autocrats depend on a narrower set of groups for political power than their 
democratic counterparts.  This set of groups is less likely to base their political support on broad 
macroeconomic conditions than on whether they benefit from the government’s economic 
policy, regardless of the economy’s overall performance. 
Taken as a whole, we therefore expect deteriorating macroeconomic conditions to impede 
commercial openness; but the effect of these conditions is likely hinge on the extent of 
institutional fragmentation.  Equally, we expect macroeconomic factors to have a more 
pronounced influence on trade policy in democracies than other countries.  The results of our 
statistical tests covering more than one hundred countries during the period from 1980 to 2000 
strongly support these arguments. 
 
Societal Interests, Political Institutions, and Trade Policy 
Various studies of trade policy emphasize the role of groups within society.1  Societal 
theories focus on how interests groups affect trade policy through demands made on public 
officials.  Such explanations view trade policy as the outcome of competition among coalitions 
with an interest in foreign commerce.  Domestic institutions and policy makers are considered  
passive actors that supply the trade policies demanded by the most influential portions of society 
(Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988). 
 Societal theories frequently infer demands for protection from macroeconomic 
conditions, contributing to a burgeoning literature has emerged on the links between aspects of 
national economic performance and foreign commerce (e.g., Baldwin 1989; Bergsten and Cline 
1983; Bhagwati 1991; Bohara and Kaempfer 1991; Cline 1989; Corden 1993; Deardorff and 
Stern 1987; Destler 1992; Dornbusch and Frankel 1987; Gardner and Kimbrough 1989; Magee, 
Brock, and Young 1989).  These theories argue that policy makers have reason to respond to 
demands for protection arising from broad segments of the populace.  There is considerable 
evidence that voters pay attention to overall macroeconomic conditions as well as their own 
economic circumstances when casting ballots (Colton 2000; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-
Beck 1988).  Furthermore, survey research indicates that public support for protectionism rises 
as domestic economic conditions deteriorate (Shapiro and Page 1994).  Government officials 
therefore have reason to raise trade barriers when these conditions worsen in an effort to bolster 
their prospects of retaining office. 
                                                 
1 The classic statement is Schattschneider (1935). 
It is widely argued that, among the macroeconomic determinants of trade policy, 
unemployment is crucial.  In fact, as C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline (1983: 77) point out, 
“conventional wisdom suggests that high levels of unemployment are the single most important 
source of protectionist pressures.”  Similarly, an International Monetary Fund study concludes 
that “perhaps the most crucial factor – and the one most likely to influence policy choices toward 
protection – is the extent and duration of existing unemployment” (Nowzad 1978: 35).  Various 
studies have arrived at the same conclusion (Hughes and Waelbroeck 1981; Wallerstein 1987).  
Heightened unemployment is expected to generate calls for protectionism by making it 
more difficult for workers to adjust to increases in imports.  Workers who lose their jobs due to 
rising import competition will find it harder to find alternative employment and are likely to be 
paid less once they become reemployed.  These workers and others who fear that they may soon 
become unemployed have reason to press for relief from foreign competition (Bradford 2003).  
So do firms that depend on consumption by these workers.  A surge in unemployment serves as a 
focusing event that stimulates workers, investors, and other interest groups adversely affected by 
open trade to overcome collective action problems and mobilize for protection (Olson 1983).  
 Whereas societal approaches point to the importance of influential segments of society in 
determining trade policy, they give short shrift to the domestic political institutions that filter 
societal demands and set policy.  Crucial in this regard are the extent of fragmentation within a 
country’s national government and its regime type. 
The fragmentation of power within a government depends on the number of independent 
partisan and institutional actors whose agreement is necessary to make policy.  These actors 
include competing branches of government and coalitions within a given branch.  As the number 
of independent actors with such veto power – or veto points – increases, societal groups have 
greater difficulty pressing for a change in policy (Henisz 2000; Tsebelis 2003).  Scholars 
working in the field of positive political theory have identified veto points as one of the most 
important institutional elements of policymaking (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; 
Tsebelis 2003; Wade 1990; Weingast and Moran 1983). 
In our context, any single actor with the authority to set trade policy understands that the 
final policy outcome must lie within a range of policies that satisfies all veto points.  To the 
extent that the preferences of the actors with veto power differ, institutional structures with more 
veto points limit the range of feasible trade policy choices.  As a result, “the potential for policy 
change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy 
positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the 
constituent units of each veto player) of these players” (Tsebelis 1995: 289).  
Several cross-national empirical studies that link policy stability to the number of veto 
points support these theoretical insights.  Hallerberg and Basinger (1998), for example, find that 
in response to tax cuts enacted by the United States in the 1980s, members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development with fewer de facto veto points lowered their tax 
rates by a greater amount than did countries with more checks and balances.  Analyzing longer 
term processes, Franzese (1999) and Treisman (2000) conclude that countries with more veto 
points have more stable (either high or low) government deficits and inflation rates, respectively.  
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) maintain that fragmented power within a government creates 
impediments to initiating and sustaining economic reform.  MacIntyre (2001) reports that a 
nonlinear relationship exists between veto points and policy responses to the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis: too many veto points generate overly rigid policies and inhibit policy change 
during economic crises whereas too few veto players lead to arbitrary or capricious changes in 
policy rather than a negotiated compromise.  Milner (1997) argues that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to forge international economic agreements as the number of veto points rises in 
prospective participants. 
Relatively few studies have addressed the effects of veto points on trade policy.  But 
Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) find that divided government has impeded trade liberalization 
by the United States.  Unified government, by contrast, has reduced the effective number of veto 
points and promoted liberalization.  In a study of post-communist countries during the 1990s, 
however, Frye and Mansfield (2003) find that trade reform grows more likely as the number of 
veto players increase, especially in non-democratic states.  This result, they argue, stems from 
the autarkic trade regimes put in place by these countries during the Cold War and the tendency 
for an increase in the number of veto players after the collapse of the Berlin Wall to expand the 
range of economic interests shaping foreign economic policy, bringing groups with an interest in 
trade liberalization on to the political stage and leading to more open overseas commerce.  
The difference between the effects of veto points in these two studies may be an 
outgrowth of variations in the status quo policy that the authors consider.  In the situation 
analyzed by Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994), the status quo trade policy is relatively open and 
was developed by a comparable set of political actors to those currently holding power.  A 
reduction in the number of veto players thus allows a subset of political actors to overcome 
opposition and push through a change in the status quo policy, leading to trade liberalization.  In 
the case of post-communist countries, by contrast, the status quo trade policy is highly 
protectionist and nations differ substantially in the extent to which the existing political actors 
and veto players are the same as or closely related to those that promoted closure.  Where veto 
players are more numerous, political regime change has brought new political actors to the table, 
fostering a new trade liberalization coalition.  Where few veto players exist, it is more likely that 
the same political actors that supported autarky remain in power.  This interpretation of these 
conflicting findings highlights the need to control for the status quo trade policy and to explore 
the impact of the nature of the political regime and any changes therein. 
 
Regime Type and Trade Policy 
Our analysis adds to the burgeoning literature on the political economy of foreign trade 
by addressing the combined effects of societal pressure generated by macroeconomic conditions 
and institutional fragmentation on political actors’ incentives to change trade policy.  Consistent 
with societal theories, heightened unemployment will stimulate interest group demands for 
policies to reduce unemployment at the expense of cheaper imports, including reductions in 
commercial openness.  Consistent with the literature on positive political theory, however, we 
also argue that that by constraining the behavior of political actors, policymaking structures with 
more fragmentation reduce the sensitivity of political actors to such societal pressures.  When a 
large number of veto players exist, there is likely to be some player that is hostile to raising trade 
barriers and can frustrate societal demands for protection.  As the number of veto players 
decline, it becomes easier to change the existing trade regime since these actors are more likely 
to have relatively homogeneous interests (Henisz 2000).  We therefore anticipate that adverse 
macroeconomic conditions should lead to a larger decline in external trade linkages as countries 
become more institutionally centralized. 
Of course, the need for leaders to respond to such demands differs markedly depending 
on whether the populace is able to monitor their behavior and penalize them for being 
unresponsive.  In democracies, the populace is able to do so.  Indeed, the hallmark of democracy 
is the existence of regular, open, and fair elections involving candidates who compete for the 
votes of a large portion of the adult population (e.g., Huntington 1991: 5-13; Przeworski et al. 
2000; Schumpeter 1942).  Furthermore, a free press and the relatively free flow of information 
about governmental activities keep constituents apprised of changes in foreign economic policy 
and leaders’ activities.  If democratic leaders do not take overt steps to cushion the effects of 
macroeconomic downturns – including an increase in trade barriers – they face the prospects of 
being turned out of office by voters.   
Non-democratic governments, by contrast, are less susceptible to broad-based societal 
demands.  The absence of electoral pressures and checks on their power by an independent and 
representative legislature give non-democratic leaders less incentive to respond to demands for 
protection arising from heightened unemployment than their democratic counterparts.  Like 
democratic leaders, autocrats rely on the support of various interest groups to maintain power.  
However, the segment of society to which an autocrat must appeal to retain office is typically 
much narrower and therefore less motivated by aggregate macroeconomic conditions than in a 
democracy.  Instead, an autocrat’s key constituents tend to focus greater attention on how 
resources are distributed within society and their share of these resources rather than national 
economic performance.  As a result, despite the absence of veto players, autocrats should also be 
less sensitive to the societal pressures generated by adverse macroeconomic conditions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2003; Brooker 2000; Wintrobe 1998). 
In sum, then, we expect commercial openness to dip as the level of unemployment rises, 
and we anticipate that the influence of unemployment will grow larger as the number of veto 
players decline.  In addition, while democracies are generally marked by a higher number of veto 
players than non-democracies, we expect the impact of unemployment and veto players to be 
more pronounced in democratic regimes.2   
Anecdotal evidence points to the role that veto players can exert on trade policy.  
Consider the cases of Chile and Peru.  In Chile a democratically-elected government came to 
power in 1989 and subsequently cut tariffs to 11 percent in 1991 (Lederman 2001: 226-27).  
                                                 
2 It is important to recognize that regime type and veto points tap different, although somewhat related, aspects of 
domestic politics.  The extent of veto points varies quite a bit among democracies and non-democracies alike (the 
mean among stable democracies is 0.60 and the standard deviation is 0.26 while among other nations the mean is 
0.09 and the standard deviation 0.20).  Furthermore, while democracies tend to have more veto points than other 
countries, the correlation between regime type and veto points is not overwhelmingly high (0.63 or 0.46, depending 
on which measure of veto points is analyzed; see Table 1).  
Based on our data, the number of veto players in Chile rose during the early 1990s.  Consistent 
with our argument, the Chilean government succeeded in warding off demands for protection 
during this decade.  As Saez, Salazar, and Vicuña (1995: 49) point out, in the early 1990s, the 
government faced “pressures to raise the level of protection” but “these pressures were not 
fruitful.”  Nor were such pressures effective at the end of this decade, despite an unemployment 
rate that rose to almost 10 percent (Lederman 2001).  Again, Chile’s maintenance of its status 
quo open trade policy accords with our claim that deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are 
less likely to yield heightened trade barriers in democracies with more extensive veto points.  
In Peru’s emerging democracy, rising unemployment during the early 1980s reached a 
rate of about 60 percent by 1984.  At the same time, Wise (1989: 170) reports that, due to 
constitutional changes and other developments, there was “greater concentration of power in the 
executive.”  As such, the number of veto players declined during the first half of the 1980s.  
Hence, it is not surprising that Peru abandoned its export-led growth strategy and increased trade 
barriers during these years (Nogues and Gulati 1994: 487; Wise 1989: 170).  We would expect 
that demands for protection spurred by heightened unemployment would have a greater effect on 
trade policy as the number of veto players declines. 
Of course these are only illustrations of our argument.  But they suggest that the factors 
we emphasize have influenced trade policy.  To more fully test our argument, we now turn to a 
set of quantitative analyses.  These analyses depart from the empirical work on the domestic 
politics of trade policy in various ways.  First, very few studies have addressed the effects of 
political fragmentation on trade policy; none that we are aware of have addressed how 
fragmentation influences the relationship between societal factors and foreign commerce.  In 
fact, while it is widely recognized that institutional and societal factors are likely to have an 
interactive effect on trade policy, little research has explicitly considered this issue (Gilligan 
1997; Mansfield and Busch 1995; Milner 1997).  Instead, most empirical studies posit that 
societal demands and policy structures operate independently of each other.  Our model, by 
contrast, explicitly accounts for the intervening role of policymaking structures and political 
regimes.  Second, the vast bulk of the empirical studies of trade policy have focused on 
democratic, advanced industrial countries.  Although there has been widespread interest in 
whether variations in regime type are linked to patterns of commercial openness, systematic 
research on this topic has been relatively scarce (Frye and Mansfield 2003; Mansfield, Milner, 
and Rosendorff 2000, 2002; Milner and Kubota forthcoming).  Equally, the work that has been 
conducted has not addressed whether the societal influences on trade policy vary between 
democracies and non-democracies.  Our analysis – covering over one hundred countries between 
1980 and 2000 – will provide some of the first quantitative results bearing on this important 
issue. 
 
Model and Measures 
 To test our argument, we begin by estimating the following model: 
tititi
titititititi
tititititi
YEARCOUNTRYPTA
GPCFRESTOTREERREERIMPORTS
POLCONUNEMPLPOLCONUNEMPLIMPORTS
,1,
1,101,91,81,71,61,5
1,1,31,21,1, *
εβββ
ββββββ
βββ
+++
+++∆+∆++
+++=∆
−
−−−−−−
−−−−
 
Our dependent variable is the annual percentage change in import penetration.  For each country, 
i, import penetration is defined as the value of imports in domestic currency divided by the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in a given year (t), using data drawn from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators.  The dependent variable is the percentage change in 
import penetration from year t-1 to year t.  We have compiled data on this variable for 176 
countries from 1980 to 2000.  The mean value of the dependent variable is two percent with a 
standard deviation of 22 percent, indicating both a slight tendency for countries to expand their 
imports over time and substantial variation in this regard within the sample. 
Of course, this measure of trade policy is not ideal since aggregate shifts in import 
penetration could reflect various factors other than policy decisions (Leamer 1988; O'Rourke and 
Williamson 1999).  However, the alternative measures that have been developed cover only a 
fraction of the countries included in our sample.  Moreover, they exclude many autocracies and 
numerous developing countries, rendering them inappropriate for our purposes.3  It is especially 
important to include countries with as wide a range of political institutions and macroeconomic 
conditions as possible, given the arguments being tested in this paper.  Recent studies of the 
impact of membership in the World Trade Organization (Rose 2004a, b; Subramanian and Wei 
2003) or participation in multilateral bodies (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2003) including Free 
Trade Areas (Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2003; Rose 2004c) have also used the aggregate 
                                                 
3 For an overview of these measures, see Edwards (1993). 
value of trade as a measure of openness and have demonstrated that this procedure yields results 
that are much the same as those derived using a wide array of alternate measures.4 Furthermore, 
protectionist trade policies should generally reduce imports and trade liberalization should 
generally increase them.  Consequently, while we consider the robustness of our results to an 
alternate measure of openness that is based on a gravity model of trade and discussed further 
below (Hiscox and Kastner 2002), there is ample reason to use ∆IMPORTSi,t in our core 
specification. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The central variables in our model are the unemployment rate (UNEMPL) and the 
extensiveness of veto points (POLCON) in each country.  All of the independent variables are 
measured in year t-1, reflecting the fact that trade policy does not respond immediately to either 
societal pressures or institutional conditions and helping to address the possibility of endogeneity 
in the model. 
As we mentioned earlier, societal theories frequently infer demands for protection from 
the unemployment rate.  The World Bank reports the unemployment rate that is given by each 
country’s national statistical agency.  These data cover the widest possible range of countries and 
years, rendering them especially useful in light of this paper’s objectives.5  Prior to 1980, 
however, unemployment data for developing countries are not compiled using a comparable 
methodology, making cross-national comparisons very difficult to conduct.  As such, our 
analysis centers on the period from 1980 to 2000.    
 The key institutional factor included in the model is the extent of the constraints faced by 
government officials in each country.  We measure this variable in terms of the veto points 
created by the structure of a country’s political institutions and the extent of partisan 
heterogeneity within and across these institutions, using the Political Constraints Index 
(POLCON) developed by Henisz (2000).6  The first step in constructing this time-varying index 
is the identification of the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and 
                                                 
4 As our interest is in the effect of societal and statist forces at the national level as opposed to the effect on dyadic 
trade of membership in a multilateral body by one or both parties, we use national import penetration as opposed to 
bilateral import flows as our dependent variable. 
5 Data from the International Labor Office offers equal coverage to the World Bank dataset and is drawn from the 
same national sources. 
6 Data and codebook are available from http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ 
ContactInfo.html 
upper legislative chambers, judiciary, and sub-federal institutions) with veto power over policy 
change in each country.  Countries lacking any formal veto points are assigned a score of 0.  For 
all other countries, the majority preference of each of these branches and the status quo policy 
are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional 
policy space [0,1]. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of 
institutional constraints using a simple spatial model of political interaction. 
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across 
branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative 
branches.  Alignment across branches increases the feasibility of policy change, thereby reducing 
the level of political constraints.  The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of 
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch.  Greater within-branch heterogeneity 
increases (decreases) the costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) branches.  The final 
measure of POLCON can take on values ranging from zero (least constrained) to one (most 
constrained).  This measure is available for all countries except microstates (data are missing for 
only 15 of the countries for which we have data on trade openness) in our sample.  Since our 
argument is that the impact of societal forces on trade policy will be moderated as the number of 
veto points rises, we also analyze UNEMPL * POLCON. 
Another key aspect of our argument is that the effects of broad societal pressures for 
protectionism as well as veto points should be qualitatively different in stable democratic nations 
than in other political regimes.  We therefore generate two sets of parameter estimates, one for 
the democratic states in the sample and another for the non-democratic states.7  We distinguish 
between democratic and non-democratic regimes using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2001), which contains separate 11-point indices of each state’s democratic (DEM) and 
autocratic (AUT) characteristics in each year.  The difference between these indices (DEM – 
AUT = REG) yields an overall measure of regime type ranging from -10 to 10 (Jaggers and Gurr 
1995).  Following much of the existing literature, we define stable democratic regimes as those 
where REG is greater than or equal to 6 for five consecutive years.  Later, however, we assess 
the robustness of the results by fluctuating this cut-off point for democracy.  
                                                 
7 In our robustness tests, we further address this issue by pooling the democratic and non-democratic states in the 
sample and including a democracy indicator variable as described in further detail below. 
Since our dependent variable is the percentage change in import penetration, it is 
important to include the level of import penetration as well.  There are practical limits on the 
extent of import penetration that countries can achieve.  Those that are already relatively open 
may find it difficult to increase import penetration much, whereas those that are relatively closed 
will face strong economic incentives to liberalize their trade regimes.  Controlling for initial 
conditions in this manner will help us to isolate the differing mechanisms that led to conflicting 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding the impact of veto players in extant 
research on trade liberalization (Frye and Mansfield 2003; Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994). 
Although our primary interest is in the interaction between societal pressures and 
domestic institutions, it is obviously important to account for various additional factors that 
might influence foreign commerce too.  To this end, we include: (1) the level and change in each 
country’s real effective exchange rate (REER and ∆REER), which alters the relative price of 
imports and thus demand for them; (2) the change in each state’s terms of trade (TOT), which 
captures relative price movements particular to a country’s imports or exports that may not be 
fully reflected in its exchange rate (e.g., the effect of an oil price shock on oil importers or oil 
exporters that control their exchange rate); (3) the government’s supply of foreign exchange 
reserves as a percentage of imports (RES), which alters its ability to withstand a run on its 
currency and increases the likelihood that it will liberalize trade as part of a multilateral program 
to restore financial stability; (4) gross private capital formation (GPCF), which plays a similar 
role to reserves in shaping trade policy; and (5) a vector of time-varying dummy variables 
indicating whether a country is a member of each of the fifty preferential trade agreements (PTA) 
that may require, encourage or solicit membership from those countries more likely to expand 
their overseas economic linkages (Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2003). Further, we include 
dummy variables indicating whether each country was a member of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation 
(COMECON), since a heavy dependence on oil exports and a command economy are likely to 
influence the evolution of trade policy.  Finally, to capture any unmeasured country-specific but 
time invariant or time-specific but country invariant heterogeneity in the data, we include 
country-specific and year-specific fixed effects.  Note, however, that to conserve space we do not 
report the estimates of these dummy variables. 
 
Results 
 We estimate the model described in the previous section using ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  Tests of statistical significance are based on panel-corrected standard errors, which 
account for any heteroskedasticity, the fact that the data are grouped by country, and, through the 
estimation of a first order autoregressive error structure whose parameter p is assumed constant 
across panels, by time (Beck and Katz 1995).  Table 1 provides summary statistics and a 
correlation matrix for the variables included in our analysis.   
The least-squares estimates are displayed in Table 2.  In the first column, we enter only 
the indicator variables; in the second column, we enter these variables and the initial level of 
trade openness.  The theoretical variables that are central to testing our argument are then 
included in the third column.  In the fourth column, we add the remaining control variables 
described in the previous section.  In the final two columns, we replicate the specification in 
column four, breaking the sample into stable democracies and other regime types, respectively.  
Because our argument is that the effects of societal influences are conditional on domestic 
political institutions, we focus our discussion of these influences on Figure 1, which presents the 
predicted marginal change in external trade linkages for a stable democracy with certain 
combinations of societal factors and institutional conditions, holding all other variables constant 
at their mean levels.  The graph does not show the predicted change in trade policy for a specific 
or even a hypothetical county.  Rather, it presents the predicted marginal change in import 
penetration resulting from varying unemployment rates and the level of political constraints as 
specified on the x- and y-axes, compared to the predicted marginal change arising from all of the 
remaining independent variables in Table 2 (including the omitted country, PTA, and time 
indicator variables) multiplied by their respective coefficient estimates in model 5 (which 
contains the parameter estimates for democracies).  In order to generate the total predicted 
change in trade policy, it is necessary to combine the partial effects displayed in Figure 1 with 
these additional variables for a specific country-year, a task that we do not undertake here. 
The downward sloping schedules in Figure 1 show that, ceteris paribus, higher 
unemployment is associated with reductions in the import penetration and hence increased 
protectionism.  Consistent with our argument, this effect is becomes stronger as the number of 
veto players declines.  For example, in a stable democracy where the number of veto players is 
approximately one standard deviation below the mean for stable democracies (0.3) and the 
unemployment rate is 10 percent, the predicted change in external trade linkages is 10 percentage 
points lower than if the unemployment rate was 2 percent (a predicted reduction of 13 percentage 
points instead of 3 percentage points) and 7 percentage points lower than if the unemployment 
rate was a more realistic 5 percent (a predicted reduction of 13 percentage points instead of 6 
percentage points). This relationship, however, is influenced by the number of veto players.  For 
example, if political constraints are held at approximately their mean level for stable democracies 
(0.6), the impact of having an unemployment rate of 10 percent instead of 2 (5) percent falls 
from a decline of 10 (7) percentage points to a decline of 2.1 (1.3) percentage points.  
 As expected, the estimate for the initial level of import penetration is large and negative, 
indicating that relatively open countries are less likely to expand their external trade linkages 
than countries that are relatively closed.  In addition, there is evidence that preferential trade 
agreements are positively associated with changes in import penetration (although we do not 
present these parameter estimates to conserve space).  Increases in the terms of trade, the 
availability of local capital, and the stock of reserves are each associated with rising import 
penetration. So, too, is a higher real exchange rate, although changes in this rate have little effect 
on trade policy.  Finally, the preferential trading agreement, year-specific, and country-specific 
indicator variables are jointly significant.  Note that the use of these fixed effects is a less 
restrictive means of capturing the impact of a time trend, national size, coastline or distance from 
other countries which, if entered independently, would impose linear or other functional 
restrictions on each of the effects. 
 
Robustness Checks 
Having generated some initial estimates of the model, it is important to assess the 
robustness of these results to alternate measures of the key constructs, alternate approaches to 
time series cross section error structures, and potentially omitted independent variables.  To 
begin, we analyze a different measure of trade policy that was constructed by Hiscox and 
Kastner (2002).  This measure involves using estimates of fixed country-year effects in a gravity 
model of trade flows to assess each state’s trade policy in a given year.8  In Table 3, we replicate 
                                                 
8 More specifically, they regressed the ratio of annual imports by country i from country j to i’s annual GDP on j’s 
annual GDP, j’s annual per capita GDP, the geographical distance between i and j, the yearly difference in i’s and j’s 
our initial results after replacing our original dependent variable with Hiscox and Kastner’s 
measure.  In interpreting these results, it is important to recognize that higher values of their 
measure indicate greater protectionism (the opposite interpretation of an increase in import 
penetration).  As such, we expect the signs of the coefficient estimates in our model to be 
reversed when focusing on this variable, and the results in Table 3 bear out this expectation.  
Indeed, the effects of unemployment and political constraints in all countries and in stable 
democracies do not depend in any significant way on which measure of trade policy we analyze, 
even though there is a substantial reduction in the sample size when Hiscox and Kastner’s 
measure is used, particularly among non-democracies.9  
Next, it is useful to assess whether our results depend on how we have defined and 
measured stable democracies.  Recall that we have coded a country as democratic if its regime 
type score based on the Polity index (which ranges from –10 to 10) is 6 or higher for five 
consecutive years.  To begin, we redefine stable democracies as those country-years where this 
index exceeds 7 (as opposed to 6).  These results, which are reported in Table 4 (models 1 and 
2), are qualitatively similar to the base specifications in Table 2 (models 5 and 6).  We also enter 
an indicator variable for stable democracies using both the original (6 and greater) and modified 
(7 and greater) thresholds into a pooled sample and once again find no substantive changes in the 
results of theoretical interest (see Table 4, models 3 and 4).  These latter specifications suggest 
that democracy does not have a direct effect on changes in import penetration.  Rather, the 
functional relationship between the structure of a nation’s political institutions and societal 
pressures, on the hand, and changes in import penetration, on the other, differ between stable 
democracies and other countries.   
We also examined an alternate measure of checks and balances: the Checks Index from 
the Database of Political Institutions 2000.10 Like the Political Constraint Index that we employ 
in our primary specification, CHECKS “counts the number of veto players in a political system, 
adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of each other, as determined by the 
level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party affiliations, and the electoral 
                                                                                                                                                             
endowments of labor and capital, and fixed country-year effects.  All of the continuous variables in the model are 
expressed in logarithmic form. 
9 Our results are also unchanged when we replace the percentage change in import penetration with the absolute 
change in import penetration or with the percentage or absolute change in overall trade openness, that is, the sum of 
a country’s imports and exports divided by its gross domestic product. 
10 Available from http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefer.htm. 
rules.” The index yields a minimum score in the absence of an effective legislature. The index 
score then increases linearly with the addition of subsequent veto points whose political 
preferences are closer to the opposition11 than the average of the government using a three-point 
scale (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001).  
While the CHECKS index takes into account the complex relationship between veto 
points, party preferences and preference heterogeneity, it also assumes a linear relationship 
between the number of adjusted veto points and the degree of constraints on policy change. 
Similarly, the number of adjusted veto points increases linearly in Parliamentary systems with 
each addition of a party to the ruling coalition without regard to the relative size of the parties in 
the coalition. Each of these results is at odds with much of the theoretical literature on veto 
points (Tsebelis 1995, 2003). As a result, we follow common practice and logarithmically 
transform the CHECKS index. The correlation between the transformed index and the Political 
Constraints Index is relatively high (0.67), but there are important cases where the two indexes 
diverge (see Henisz, 2004 for a description of these cases). The results displayed in Models 5-7 
of Table 4 show that our results are robust to the use of this alternate measure of veto points. 
Next, we address concerns of endogeneity by adopting the dynamic panel estimator of 
Arrelano and Bond (1991). Caselli et al. (1996) argue that OLS estimators such as we use in our 
primary specification are biased and inconsistent for two separate reasons. First, the country-
specific effects – including any omitted variables – are necessarily correlated with the other 
independent variables. Second, the control variables are likely, to some extent, to be endogenous. 
For example, decreasing openness may be a function of a short-term increase in unemployment.  
But if openness promotes growth (Wacziarg and Welch 2003), then in the long-term, openness 
should decrease unemployment. Ignoring this relationship will lead to upwardly biased 
coefficient estimates because the endogenous variable, in reality, appears on the right-hand side 
of the estimating equation. Furthermore, the estimators will be inconsistent since the regressors 
are correlated with the error term, which combines the error in the specified relationship with the 
error term in the simultaneous equation where unemployment is a function of openness. 
A common practice in the literature is to use lagged variables as an instrument for potentially 
endogenous regressors  in a three stage least squares regression. While this procedure addresses 
                                                 
11 The opposition is defined as the largest opposition party in Presidential regimes and the three largest opposition 
parties in Parliamentary regimes. 
the endogeneity problem discussed above, it neglects the bias and inconsistency created by the 
omitted variable or fixed effect.  Nor does it take into account any time specific shocks or time 
trends.  
By contrast, Casseli et al. (1996) demonstrate that a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator is consistent if three identifying assumptions are met: (1) there is no second-
order serial correlation, (2) “stock” variables in the model are predetermined at time t-2, and (3) 
“flow” variables are not predetermined at time t-2 but are predetermined at time t-1.  To derive 
their GMM estimator, the authors use a two-step process suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991).  A first-step estimate is made using the assumption of independently and identically 
distributed error terms. Consistent but inefficient (assuming heteroskedasticity) estimates of the 
error terms are computed and then used in a second stage regression in which the assumption of 
homoskedasticity imposed in the first stage is relaxed. The results using this Generalized Method 
of Moments estimator for stable democracies are largely unchanged, indicating that these results 
are quite robust.  However, in the pooled sample or the subsample of other countries, there are 
some noticeable differences in the results (see Table 5). Nonetheless, consistent with our 
argument, we continue to find that the influence of unemployment on trade policy grows larger 
as the number of veto players declines in democracies, but that these factors have relatively 
bearing on commercial policy in non-democratic regimes 
Finally, we examine a range of macroeconomic variables and country characteristics 
suggested by the literature as potential determinants of openness to ensure that they do not 
account for the observed effects of unemployment and veto points on trade policy.  First, we use 
an alternate normalization for international reserves, a ratio of GDP instead of imports. Second, 
we analyze five different measures of inflation: (1) as derived from the consumer price index 
[CPI] , (2) as derived from the GDP deflator, (3) the log of the CPI derived measure, (4) the log 
of the GDP deflator-derived measure, and (5) indicator variables for inflation levels in excess of 
10 percent and 100 percent, respectively.  High levels of inflation could signal an impending 
financial crisis, stimulating commercial reform (Krueger 1993; Rodrik 1996).  Third, we analyze 
real gross domestic product.  Economically large states may have the ability to impose an 
optimal tariff and have domestic alternatives to imports, thereby impeding trade liberalization. 
Fourth, we analyze real per capita GDP.  Heightened economic development could enhance 
liberalization as a country increasingly trades in differentiated industrial products.  Finally, we 
address four measures of inward capital flows -- gross foreign direct investment (FDI), gross FDI 
and portfolio investment, net FDI, net FDI and portfolio investment and the government budget 
balance -- which are additional measures of financial stability and thereby increase the likelihood 
of liberalization in the context of financial stabilization. Table 6 reports the results from these 
supplementary analyses for the subsample of stable democracies.  The findings indicate that, 
with the exception of the alternate definition of gross international reserves, none of these 
variables are statistically significant; nor does their introduction into the primary specification 
substantively alter the empirical support for our hypotheses.  Taken as a whole, then, the tests 
described in this section offer considerable evidence that our results are quite robust. 
 
Discussion 
The results of this paper have various implications for research on the political economy 
of trade policy.  First, social scientists have long debated the merits of societal and statist 
approaches.  While many studies have privileged one approach over the other, our findings 
indicate the importance of acknowledging their interdependence.  As many societal theories 
emphasize, changes in macroeconomic conditions influence the preferences of the populace at 
large.  These preferences have a considerable bearing on foreign economic policy.  At the same 
time, however, statist factors are also important in this regard.  Both the number of veto points in 
a government and a country’s regime type heavily influence its responsiveness to demands for 
change in its trade orientation.   
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the interaction between societal and statist 
variables are central to shaping trade policy.  Various studies have raised this issue, but 
remarkably little empirical research has directly confronted it (Gilligan 1997; Mansfield and 
Busch 1995; Milner 1997).  The effects of unemployment depend heavily on the number of veto 
players that constrain decision makers and whether a country is democratic or not.  High 
unemployment leads to protectionist trade policies in stable democracies marked by few veto 
players.  As expected, however, the magnitude of this relationship becomes attenuated as the 
number of veto players rises, making it more difficult to change the existing trade regime and 
increasing the heterogeneity of the players’ interests.  Equally, macroeconomic fluctuations have 
a much more pronounced influence on the trade regime in democracies than other countries, 
reflecting the need for democratic leaders to be more responsive to demands made by the general 
population than their non-democratic counterparts.  
Second, our results bear heavily on recent debates about the relationship between regime 
type and economic reform.  Virtually all of the literature on this topic ignores the effects of 
institutional variations within both democracies and non-democracies alike.  Such variations, 
however, are crucial to explaining changes in trade policy, especially in democracies.  Holding 
macroeconomic conditions constant, the trade regime changes less within democracies as the 
number of veto players increases.  Furthermore, as macroeconomic conditions worsen and 
societal calls for protectionism become louder and more widespread, increases in trade barriers 
are more likely to occur as the number of veto players declines.  When a country’s economy is 
thriving – marked by very low levels of unemployment – thereby creating a substantial 
constituency for expanding commercial openness, such an expansion is most likely to occur in 
countries with few veto points.  Not only do these results indicate that regime type is just one 
aspect of the institutional influences on trade policy, they also point to the importance of veto 
points, a factor that has been underemphasized in existing studies of trade policy.  
Similarly, we find that, within democracies, changes in import penetration are more 
likely to occur as the number of veto points declines.  However, whether such changes lead to 
greater protection or liberalization hinges on the demands being issued by societal groups.  When 
the economy is faltering, giving rise to calls for protection, a small number of veto points tends 
to promote greater closure; when the economy is flourishing, a small number of these points 
foster greater openness.  Our results offer important qualifications to studies making 
unconditional comparisons between either domestic political concentration and fragmentation or 
democracy and autocracy on commercial openness and economic reform (Haggard 1990; 
Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Wade 1990).  Just as the effects of societal forces depend on 
domestic institutions, the effects of institutions are contingent on societal forces. 
Third, our focus in this paper has been on the domestic sources of overseas commerce.  
However, our results indicate that in addition to such sources, international organizations shape 
states’ trade policy. For example, countries that are members of preferential trading agreements 
are more likely to expand their import penetration than states that do not participate in these 
organizations.  This finding is hardly surprising, but in light of the emphasis that contemporary 
studies of foreign commerce place on domestic forces, it does serve as a useful reminder that 
such studies need to account for international forces as well (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2003).  
 
Conclusions 
The remarkable expansion of global trade since World War II has stimulated a large and 
important literature, much of which stresses the effects of domestic politics on trade policy.  This 
literature, however, has miscast certain aspects of the domestic determinants of trade policy.  
Whereas societal and statist factors are usually viewed as having independent and competing 
influences, these factors actually have an interactive effect on trade policy.  Deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions give rise to societal demands for protectionism.  But the extent to 
which these demands are met and barriers to trade are put in place depends on the domestic 
political institutions through which societal pressures are filtered. 
Furthermore, while a rising number of studies emphasize that democracy promotes open 
trade, the trade policy of democracies hinges on the extent of the constraints placed on leaders 
and the underlying societal pressures that these leaders face. When leaders face a greater number 
of veto points, it becomes harder to change policy.  When unemployment soars, leaders face 
increased incentives to restrict commercial openness. Consequently, whether spreading 
democracy throughout the world will promote prosperity and free trade – as many observers 
have argued – depends on institutional factors within democracies, global and local 
macroeconomic conditions, and the patterns of domestic interest group competition.  A better 
understanding of these factors and how they operate is crucial to improving our understanding of 
the political economy of trade policy. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
N 3093 1473 3124 1473 3398 3277 1172 1162 1512 1437 2863 2741 2878 2950
Mean 0.02 0.02 37.54 31.72 0.28 0.62 8.17 4.53 3.28 0.01 0.00 13.33 3.45 0.12
Standard Deviation 0.22 0.13 24.07 10.03 0.33 0.67 5.71 3.93 98.43 0.26 0.13 35.05 2.91 0.14
Minimum -0.68 -0.74 0.69 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.02 -1.00 -1.13 0.00 -0.09 0.00
Maximum 3.54 2.55 223.64 66.27 0.89 2.89 42.20 18.72 3796.86 7.92 3.20 688.64 24.66 1.71
Change in import penetration 1
Change in Hiscox/Kastner measure 2 -0.25
Level of import penetration 3 0.24 -0.15
Level of Hiscox Hiscox/Kastner measure 4 -0.10 0.10 -0.55
Political constraints 5 -0.10 -0.12 0.23 -0.32
Checks 6 -0.03 -0.04 0.13 -0.16 0.67
Unemployment Rate 7 -0.08 0.17 -0.14 -0.13 0.04 0.11
Political constraints * Unemployment Rate 8 -0.10 -0.06 0.03 -0.14 0.83 0.62 0.44
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index / 1000 9 -0.23 0.35 -0.28 0.24 -0.25 -0.31 -0.10 -0.23
Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate Index 10 -0.40 -0.08 0.07 -0.14 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.03
Change in Terms of Trade / GDP 11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.31 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.21 0.06 -0.12
Gross Private Capital Formation / GDP 12 -0.13 0.13 0.10 -0.36 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.13 -0.10 0.08 0.10
Gross International Reserves / Imports 13 -0.09 0.02 -0.43 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.32 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.22
Gross International Reserves / GDP 14 -0.05 -0.13 0.24 -0.35 0.43 0.24 0.03 0.35 -0.16 0.07 -0.01 0.38 0.72 0.39
Inflation (CPI) 15 0.63 -0.09 0.36 -0.18 -0.13 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.33 0.17 -0.26 -0.06 -0.16 -0.05
Inflation (GDP Deflator) 16 0.76 -0.08 0.35 -0.18 -0.14 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.31 -0.02 -0.22 -0.06 -0.16 -0.05
Log Inflation (CPI) 17 0.47 -0.03 0.34 -0.23 -0.08 0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.41 0.27 -0.28 0.03 -0.12 -0.04
Log Inflation (GDP Deflator) 18 0.49 -0.02 0.35 -0.23 -0.09 0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.41 0.22 -0.27 0.03 -0.12 -0.06
Inflation Indicator (>33% < 100%) 19 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.14 0.30 0.32 0.10 0.34 -0.33 -0.09 -0.10 0.26 0.12 0.10
Inflation Indicator (>100% < 1000%) 20 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.09 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.05 -0.16 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.09 -0.04
Inflation Indicator (>1000%) 21 0.43 -0.01 0.40 -0.19 -0.13 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 -0.31 0.29 -0.30 -0.02 -0.18 -0.06
Real Gross Domestic Product ($b) 22 -0.01 -0.03 -0.24 0.53 -0.19 -0.14 -0.21 -0.15 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 0.20 0.09
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita ($) 23 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.47 0.56 0.36 0.12 0.46 -0.20 -0.03 0.23 0.43 0.58 0.39
Gross Foreign Direct Investment / GDP 24 -0.06 -0.17 0.45 -0.31 0.34 0.23 -0.10 0.15 -0.18 -0.04 0.23 0.27 -0.04 -0.12
Net Foreign Direct Investment / GDP 25 -0.06 -0.13 0.50 -0.29 0.37 0.26 -0.09 0.17 -0.14 -0.01 0.23 0.19 -0.08 -0.14
Portfolio Investment / GDP 26 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.18 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.60 0.27 0.28
Government Budget Balance / GDP 27 -0.31 0.08 -0.16 -0.13 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.20 -0.01 -0.28 0.25 0.18 0.30 0.10
Debt Service / GDP 28 -0.10 0.11 0.27 -0.33 0.21 0.00 0.28 0.21 -0.08 0.16 0.05 0.38 -0.11 -0.03
Debt Service / Exports 29 -0.09 0.24 -0.17 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 0.36 0.07 0.10 0.16 -0.01 0.23 -0.02 -0.02
Stable Democracy (0,1) 30 -0.06 0.02 -0.24 -0.03 0.63 0.46 0.20 0.66 -0.09 -0.03 -0.21 0.03 0.23 0.40  
Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued)
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
N 2757 3173 2757 3173 3447 3447 3447 3103 3103 2712 2918 2542 2288 2293 2213 3447
Mean 69.17 79.83 4.81 4.82 0.09 0.04 0.01 177.00 5973.67 2.42 1.48 0.00 -3.84 5.66 19.14 0.34
Standard Deviation 636.33 743.69 0.43 0.47 0.28 0.19 0.11 700.00 9340.94 3.92 2.92 0.03 6.23 5.51 14.81 0.47
Minimum -13.05 -29.17 4.48 4.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 84.72 0.00 -25.78 -0.30 -64.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 23773.12 26762.01 10.08 10.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 8650.00 52710.83 56.01 39.86 0.45 58.71 107.45 180.85 1.00
Change in import penetration
Change in Hiscox indicator
Level of import penetration
Level of Hiscox indicator
Political constraints
Checks
Unemployment Rate
Political constraints X Unemployment Rate
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index / 1000
Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate Index
Change in Terms of Trade / GDP
Gross Private Capital Formation / GDP
Gross International Reserves / Imports
Gross International Reserves / GDP
Inflation (CPI) -0.01
Inflation (GDP Deflator) -0.04 0.96
Log Inflation (CPI) 0.04 0.94 0.89
Log Inflation (GDP Deflator) 0.02 0.93 0.90 1.00
Inflation Indicator (>33% < 100%) 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.08
Inflation Indicator (>100% < 1000%) 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.05
Inflation Indicator (>1000%) 0.01 0.91 0.87 0.97 0.97 -0.08 -0.02
Real Gross Domestic Product ($b) -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.06 -0.12
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita ($) 0.67 -0.21 -0.20 -0.13 -0.14 0.30 0.30 -0.24 -0.19
Gross Foreign Direct Investment / GDP 0.34 -0.17 -0.16 -0.20 -0.20 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 0.14 0.24
Net Foreign Direct Investment / GDP 0.31 -0.15 -0.15 -0.20 -0.20 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17 0.11 0.22 0.92
Portfolio Investment / GDP 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.16 -0.01 -0.04
Government Budget Balance / GDP 0.20 -0.64 -0.53 -0.47 -0.44 0.14 0.08 -0.47 0.02 0.35 0.22 0.17 0.04
Debt Service / GDP 0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.20 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.27
Debt Service / Exports -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.09 0.13 -0.04 0.06 0.14 -0.16 0.05 -0.16 -0.18 -0.03 0.26 0.80
Stable Democracy? 0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 0.22 0.15 -0.15 -0.10 0.34 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.23 -0.01 0.08
Table 2: Effects of Unemployment and Political Constraints on Trade Policy, 1980-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N 2532 2532 1008 731 587 144
# Countries 149 149 96 58 44 26
R-squared 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.72 0.39 0.90
Sample All All All All stable other
democracies countries
Level of Import Penetration -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Political Constraints 0.001 -0.136 -0.273 -0.055
0.987 0.014 0.000 0.628
Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.005 -0.023 -0.001
0.858 0.087 0.001 0.749
Political Constraints * 0.001 0.012 0.034 -0.013
  Unemployment Rate 0.877 0.007 0.000 0.235
Real Effective Exchange 0.000 -0.001 0.000
  Rate 0.000 0.164 0.000
Change in Real Effective -0.031 -0.102 0.027
  Exchange Rate 0.450 0.117 0.586
Change in Terms of Trade 0.721 0.626 1.247
0.001 0.007 0.004
Gross Private Capital 0.001 0.001 -0.002
  Formation / GDP 0.013 0.026 0.479
Gross International 0.014 0.012 0.026
  Reserves / Imports 0.000 0.001 0.003
Notes: P-values reported in italics under OLS coefficient estimates using panel-corrected standard errors.
     Coefficient estimates on IGO, country and year indicator variables are not reported to conserve space.
Table 3: Effects of Unemployment and Political Constraints on the Hiscox/Kastner Measure 
              of Trade Policy, 1980-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N 1063 1063 480 375 299 76
# Countries 82 82 51 38 30 11
R-squared 0.23 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.78
Sample All All All All stable other
democracies countries
Hiscox/Kastner Measure -0.014 -0.018 -0.023 -0.027 -0.018
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Political Constraints 0.166 0.186 0.769 0.165
0.029 0.099 0.025 0.028
Unemployment Rate 0.006 0.008 0.033 0.005
0.085 0.010 0.106 0.014
Political Constraints * -0.034 -0.038 -0.076 -0.028
  Unemployment Rate 0.004 0.005 0.016 0.015
Real Effective Exchange 0.000 0.001 0.000
  Rate 0.671 0.155 0.542
Change in Real Effective -0.021 -0.164 0.005
  Exchange Rate 0.349 0.086 0.728
Change in Terms of Trade -0.013 -0.077 -0.357
0.960 0.839 0.259
Gross Private Capital 0.000 0.000 -0.001
  Formation / GDP 0.878 0.876 0.727
Gross International -0.001 0.003 -0.191
  Reserves / Imports 0.725 0.592 0.234
Notes: P-values reported in italics under OLS coefficient estimates using panel-corrected standard errors.
     Coefficient estimates on IGO, country and year indicator variables are not reported to conserve space.
     The value of the Hiscox/Kastner measure is inversely correlated with the degree of trade openness.  
Table 4: Effects of Unemployment and Political Constraints on Trade Policy, 1980-2000
              Using Alternate Measures of Political Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N 570 161 731 731 723 583 140
# Countries 40 28 58 58 58 45 25
R-squared 0.37 0.88 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.38 0.90
Sample stable other All All stable other
democracies countries democracies countries
Level of Import Penetration -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Measure of Political -0.320 -0.151 -0.143 -0.138 -0.048 -0.061 -0.015
  Institutions (See Note) 0.000 0.173 0.011 0.014 0.047 0.060 0.751
Unemployment Rate -0.033 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 0.005
0.001 0.797 0.082 0.087 0.160 0.086 0.433
Political Constraints * 0.045 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.009 -0.008
  Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.629 0.007 0.007 0.029 0.019 0.231
Real Effective Exchange -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
  Rate 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000
Change in Real Effective -0.119 -0.005 -0.029 -0.031 -0.034 -0.104 0.018
  Exchange Rate 0.079 0.919 0.468 0.452 0.416 0.118 0.731
Change in Terms of Trade 0.620 0.933 0.702 0.715 0.662 0.636 1.500
0.009 0.025 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.010
Gross Private Capital 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002
  Formation / GDP 0.034 0.287 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.012 0.412
Gross International 0.012 0.027 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.027
  Reserves / Imports 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002
Stable Democracy (0,1) 0.033 0.010
0.123 0.659
Note: P-values reported in italics under OLS coefficient estimates using panel-corrected standard errors.
     Coefficient estimates on IGO, country and year indicator variables are not reported to conserve space.
     Models (1)-(3) define stable democracies using a threshold of 6 on the Polity scale;
     Models (3)-(4) include an indicator variable for stable democracies into the full sample; and
     Models (5)-(7) use the CHECKS index instead of the Political Constraint Index.  
Table 5: Effects of Unemployment and Political Constraints on Trade Policy, 1980-2000
              Using the Generalized Method of Moments Estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N 2353 947 661 550 111
# Countries 148 82 53 42 21
Log-Likelihood 624.34 3546.70 4437.01 6353.74 6307.80
Sample All All All stable other
democracies countries
Level of Import Penetration -0.021 -0.019 -0.007 -0.009 -0.015
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.015
Political Constraints 0.132 -0.189 -0.331 -0.021
0.211 0.082 0.000 0.912
Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.005 -0.034 0.001
0.767 0.318 0.000 0.875
Political Constraints * -0.012 0.012 0.048 -0.033
  Unemployment Rate 0.194 0.093 0.000 0.078
Real Effective Exchange 0.000 -0.001 0.000
  Rate 0.000 0.244 0.000
Change in Real Effective -0.025 -0.153 0.056
  Exchange Rate 0.765 0.011 0.490
Change in Terms of Trade 0.798 0.648 1.047
0.004 0.000 0.031
Gross Private Capital 0.001 0.001 0.005
  Formation / GDP 0.141 0.125 0.806
Gross International 0.013 0.012 0.026
  Reserves / Imports 0.008 0.008 0.031
H0: No 2nd order autcorrelation p=0.124 p=0.754 p=0.607 p=0.153 p=0.456
Note: P-values reported in italics under OLS coefficient estimates using dynamic panel estimator.
     Coefficient estimates on IGO, country and year indicator variables are not reported to conserve space.  
 
Table 6: Effects of Unemployment and Political Constraints on Trade Policy, 1980-2000
              Rotating in Potentially Omitted Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
N 587 585 587 585 587 587 587 587 581 557 581 557 538
# Countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 43 44 43 41
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Level of Import Penetration -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Political Constraints -0.258 -0.274 -0.261 -0.274 -0.254 -0.265 -0.246 -0.249 -0.245 -0.304 -0.244 -0.306 -0.251
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Unemployment Rate -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.027 -0.021 -0.027 -0.024
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001
Political Constraints * 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.040 0.032 0.040 0.037
  Unemployment Rate 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Real Effective Exchange -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
  Rate 0.161 0.169 0.187 0.170 0.231 0.237 0.105 0.179 0.099 0.184 0.101 0.176 0.072
Change in Real Effective -0.103 -0.099 -0.106 -0.099 -0.108 -0.099 -0.088 -0.096 -0.091 -0.119 -0.092 -0.117 -0.088
  Exchange Rate 0.124 0.134 0.109 0.134 0.103 0.130 0.190 0.190 0.179 0.070 0.176 0.070 0.186
Change in Terms of Trade 0.653 0.624 0.624 0.624 0.622 0.629 0.684 0.649 0.697 0.755 0.712 0.733 0.700
0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
Gross Private Capital 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
  Formation / GDP 0.030 0.023 0.027 0.023 0.029 0.034 0.043 0.025 0.099 0.007 0.106 0.004 0.090
Gross International 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
  Reserves / Imports 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Rotated Variable(s) 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.025 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.000
  (See Note) 0.022 0.967 0.739 0.960 0.461 0.282 0.384 0.157 0.966 0.407 0.768 0.444 0.685
0.038 0.090 0.080
0.331 0.623 0.669
Note: P-values reported in italics under OLS coefficient estimates using dynamic panel estimator.
     Coefficient estimates on IGO, country and year indicator variables are not reported to conserve space.
     We rotate in the following variable(s) in the noted model number (1) Gross International Reserves / GDP (2) Inflation, CPI;
         (3) Inflation, GDP; (4) Log Inflation, CPI; (5) Log Inflation, GDP; (6) Inflation Indicator Variables; (7) Real GDP;
         (8) Real Per Capita GDP; (9) gross FDI inflows; (10) gross FDI inflows and portfolio inflows; (11) net FDI inflows; 
         (12) net FDI inflows and portfolio flows; and (13) government budget balance.
Figure 1: Political Constraints Moderate Societal Pressures for Protectionism
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